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Water: PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington
Department of Ecology: State Water Quality Certification

of Federally Licensed Hydropower Projects
L Introduction
The conflict between federal and state power in the United States is a conflict of
epic proportions. Since the failure of the Articles of Confederation, the federal
government has consistently asserted its preeminence over the states. Federal
supremacy has been as evident in the field of hydropower facility regulation as it
has been in any other area of governmental regulation. However, in PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Washington Departmentof Ecology,' the Supreme Court of the
United States found that the federal government relinquished to the states some of
its control over the authority to license and relicense hydropower projects.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has general authority to
issue licenses to operators of hydropower projects.2 The states have consistently
challenged the exclusivity of FERC's authority. The general result of these
challenges has been judicial recognition of federal preemption of regulatory
authority over hydropower projects. The seminal case in the debate over FERC's
preemptive authority is First Iowa Hydroelectric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Commission.3 First Iowa has generally been regarded as recognizing federal
preemption of state regulatory authority over hydropower projects.
The Supreme Court did not overrule FirstIowa in the Jefferson County decision.
The Supreme Court did decide that the states have a substantial role to play in the
federal licensing process as a result of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The effect of
the Court's ruling is that the states have a broad veto power over the federal
licensing and relicensing of hydropower projects
Section 401 of the CWA requires applicants for federal licenses conducting any
activity which will result in a discharge into intrastate navigable waters to obtain
water quality certification from the State before a federal license or permit may be
issued.' Section 401 applies to all federal licenses, but only hydropower licenses
are at issue here. The section 401 certification is a prerequisite to federal licensing,
and thereby allows the states to balance the benefits of hydropower production
against the harm which will be caused to the local water resource. Because
hydropower projects have their greatest effects, both positive and negative, at the

1. 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994).
2. FERC's authority derives from the commerce clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. Water was held to be a commodity in and of itself in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954
(1982), and therefore is interstate commerce subject to the regulatory authority of the federal government
under the commerce clause.
3. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
4. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1910-11.
5. Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
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local and regional le-vel, it is appropriate that states should have a prominent role
in the licensing and relicensing process.
The decision in Jefferson County has far-reaching consequences. The operating
licenses of over two hundred privately owned hydropower projects have recently
expired.' These projects are currently awaiting licensing reviews In addition,
many more licenses are due to expire over the next several years.' Most of these
projects received their original licenses when there was a perceived federal need for
promotion of federal hydropower facilities during the New Deal Era. Since the
original licensing of these projects, environmental concerns about protecting stream
flows for fish, wildlife, recreation, or water quality purposes have come to the
forefront of public consciousness. In addition, a renewed interest in states' rights has
emerged.
These existing projects, and any new hydropower projects, will have to meet
broad state water quality requirements in order to acquire the necessary license to
operate. The nature of these state requirements should reflect the striking of a
balance at the state rather than the federal level between the desire for affordable
energy and the desire to preserve the environment.
II. History: Section 401 Certificationof Hydropower Projects
Section 401 of the CWA provides for state water quality certification as a
prerequisite to issuance of federal permits and licenses for hydropower projects.'
An applicant for a federal permit or license whose activities will result in a
discharge into waters of the United States must obtain state water quality
certification from the appropriate state administrative agency." The certification
ensures compliance with state water quality requirements and with specific sections
of the CWA, including section 303."
Section 303 of the CWA requires the states to institute comprehensive water
quality standards which incorporate water quality goals for all intrastate waters.'
These water quality standards consist of two different types of standards designated uses and water quality criteria. 3 The water quality criteria include
specific numerical criteria, measuring such things as dissolved oxygen content, fecal
coliform organisms, temperature, pH, dissolved gas, and turbidity. Water quality
criteria also include narrative standards for concerns such as toxicity and aesthetic
values. The designated uses may include such items as water supply, stock
watering, salmonid habitat, wildlife habitat, recreation, commerce, and navigation.

6. Melissa Healy, St2tes Can Mandate Dam Water Levels, Supreme Court Says, L.A. TIMES, June
1, 1994, at A3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Clean Water Act, § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
10. Id. § 401(a)(1).
11. IL
12. Id. § 303.
13. Id. § 303(c)(2)(A).
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In addition, section 303 contains an antidegradation policy which requires that state
standards be sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of state waters without
further degradation. 4
The Court's decision in Jefferson County that ensuring compliance with section
303 is a proper function of the section 401 state certification process is the basis for
extensive state regulatory authority under the CWA. Prior to Jefferson County, State
courts had offered different interpretations of the extent and scope of state authority
under section 401. Some decisions construed section 401 narrowly as applying only
to the protection of specific numerical criteria. Other decisions construed section
401 broadly as allowing the state to condition certification on criteria which protect
both numerical and narrative criteria as well as designated uses of the water.
The Vermont Supreme Court construed section 401 broadly in Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation. The court held that
under section 401 of the CWA, the State could condition the relicensing of a
hydropower project on the requirement that the project operator maintain certain
spillage flows over a dam during specific periods of the year. 6 The portion of the
river below the dam was designated a cold water fish habitat under the Vermont
water quality standards, requiring a dissolved oxygen level of 6.2 mg/.' 7 The
Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) determined that the
project would need to release 210 cubic feet per second (cfs) over the dam between
June 1 and October 15 to meet this criteria.'" In addition, the court found that this
spillage flow rate would act to prevent aquatic habitat degradation, protect
downstream water quality for fish (including Atlantic Salmon), and restore the
aesthetic value of the downstream river.'9
The private owner of the hydroelectric facility argued that DEC did not have the
authority to set such broad conditions for state certification of the project under
section 401. Nevertheless, the court utilized a broad interpretation of section 401,
finding that the spillage flow rates required by the DEC were necessary to maintain
state water quality standards.? Specifically, the flow rates were necessary to
maintain the dissolved oxygen standards of the river. The court also found that
these spillage flows were relevant to the aesthetic and recreational values of the
river."
The Court of Appeals of New York construed section 401 narrowly in Power
Authority of New York v. Williams.' The Williams court held that the state

14. Id. § 303(d)(4)(B).
15. 35 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2052 (Vt. 1992).
16. Id. at 2053.
17. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Vermont Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 35 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2046,
2050 (Vt. Super. Ct. 1992).
18. Id.
19. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Vermont Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 35 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2052,
2053 (Vt. 1992).
20. Id. at 2053-54.
21. Id. at 2054.
22. 457 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1983).
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regulatory authority could not grant or deny the certification based upon a balancing
of the needs of the project against the adverse environmental impact.' The court
found that section 401 of the CWA limited the state regulatory authority to
determining whether the project met the state's numerical water quality standards.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington Department of Ecology in order to resolve the conflict between the
holdings in these two cases. In State Dept. of Ecology v. PUD No. I,' the
Washington Supreme Court utilized a broad interpretation of section 401, holding
that section 401(d) authorized the State to issue minimum stream flow requirements,
and that the Federal Power Act (FPA) did not preempt the State's actions.' The
Supreme Court affirmed the broad holding of the Washington Supreme Court.'
III. PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology
A. Facts
Petitioners, the City of Tacoma, Washington and a local utility district, Public
Utility District (PUD) No. 1 of Jefferson County, proposed the construction of the
Elkhorn Hydroelectric Project on the Dosewallips River. 9 The project involved the
construction of a diversion dam in the river. The dam would divert water into a
tunnel, also known as a penstock, which would run along the stream for 1.2
miles. 0 The water in the tunnel would pass through two hydropowered generating
units which would produce electricity. The diverted water would then be returned
to the river at the tailrace.
The water flow in the bypass reach of the river, that portion between the
diversion dam and the tailrace, ranges between 149 and 738 cfs.3" The project
contemplates removiig between 50 and 600 cfs. from the river's flow, depending
upon the seasonal variations in the flow. Thus, roughly seventy-five percent of the

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 729-30.
Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1908.
849 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1993), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994).

27. Id. at 659.
28. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
29. The Dosewallips River originates in the eastern Olympic Mountains of Washington state and
flows east to Hood Canal Tn western Puget Sound. Brief for Respondents at 7, PUD No. I of Jefferson
County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994) (No. 92-1911).
In Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, the Supreme Court notes that the proposed construction site
of the project is on federally owned land which is within the Olympic National Forest, and is just outside
the Olympic National Park. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1907.
30. The portion of the river beginning at the diversion dam and continuing downstream 1.2 miles
to the tailrace is known as the by-pass reach. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Jefferson County (No. 92-1911).
The diversion dam is to be ten feet high and fifty feet across. The dam completely blocks the flow
of the river, but does not create a reservoir. Brief for Respondents at 8, Jefferson County (No. 92-1911).
The project operates in a run-of-river mode which results in the diversion, but not the storage, of
water. Brief for Petitioner; at 12, Jefferson County (No. 92-1911).
31. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1907.
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river's flow would be diverted into the tunnel at the dam site.3" The remaining
twenty-five percent of the water would be returned from the penstock to the bypass
reach, through sluice gates or a fish ladder.3
The upper portion of the Dosewallips River, where the project was to be located,
supports populations of Coho and Chinook salmon, as well as Steelhead trout.'
The State of Washington classifies the Dosewallips River as Class AA (extraordinary), the highest rating which can be given to a water body." The migration,
rearing, spawning, and harvesting of salmonid and other fish are characteristic uses
of Class AA waters.'
B. PriorHistory of the Case
The FPA authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
license new hydroelectric facilities and relicense existing facilities.37 Section 401
of the CWA requires hydroelectric projects whose activities may result in discharges
into navigable waters to obtain state certification as a condition of the federal
license. Petitioners applied to the Washington State Department of Ecology for the
section 401 certificate in 1983.38
Petitioners, in conjunction with the Department of Ecology and other agencies,
then conducted a two-year study of the prospective effects of the project on the fish
habitat in the bypass reach of the river. 9 Following completion of this study,
Petitioners proposed the maintenance of minimum instream flows between 65 cfs.
and 155 cfs.6 The Department of Ecology found these minimum instream flows
that
inadequate and issued the section 401 certificate with the requirement
4
Petitioners maintain instream flows of between 100 cfs. and 200 cfs. 1
Petitioners appealed the minimum instream flow requirements of the certificate
to the Pollution Control Hearings Board (Board). 42 The Board held that the
Department of Ecology was acting within its authority in placing the minimum flow
conditions in the section 401 certifications in order to preserve the fishery.43
However, in a subsequent hearing, the Board held that the required minimum flows
were intended to enhance, not merely preserve, the fishery." As a result, the Board
found that the Department of Ecology had exceeded its authority under state law..

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1908.
Id.
Brief for Respondents at 7, Jefferson County (No. 92-1911).
WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-201-010 to -120 (1990).

36. Id. § 173-201-045(1)(b)(iii).
37. Federal Power Act, ch. 285,41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e),

799 (1988)).
38. State Dep't of Ecology, 849 P.2d at 649.
39. Id. These groups included the Washington State Departments of Fisheries and Wildlife Service,
the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the Point No Point Treaty Council.

40. Id.
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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Thus, the Board reversed the flow rates.45
The parties appealed the Board's findings to the Thurston County Superior Court
which reinstated the stream flow rates promulgated by the Department of
Ecology." The Petitioners appealed the decision of the Superior Court to the
Supreme Court of Washington. The Washington Supreme Court held that the
minimum instream flows were necessary for the project's compliance with state
water quality standards, and that section 401(d) of the CWA authorized the states
to require the minimum stream flows.47 Petitioners appealed the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court which granted
certiorari!'
C. Justice O'Connor'sMajority Opinion
The Court stated the issue of the case as "whether the minimum stream flow
requirement that the State imposed on the Elkhorn project is a permissible condition
of a section 401 certification under the Clean Water Act." 9 This narrow statement
of the issue allows the Court to reach a holding implicating broad conceptions of
federalism without directly addressing the federal preemption that has generally
been recognized in the hydroelectric power industry. The Court utilized a two step
approach to resolve the question. First, the Court determined the scope of the State's
authority under section 401. Second, the Court inquired as to whether the
imposition of minimum stream flows was within the scope of the State's authority
under section 401.
The Court determined that under section 401 the State has authority to condition
certification on maintenance of state water quality standards adopted pursuant to
section 303 of the CWA. 0 The Court further decided that the State could impose
minimum stream flows as a means of protecting both specific criteria and
designated uses, as well as to implement the State's antidegradation policy.
1. Scope of the Stote's Authority Under Section 401
The Court examined section 401(d) in order to determine the scope of the State's
authority to condition federal licenses on state water quality standards. Section
401(d) provides:
Any certification provided under this section shall set forth any
effluent limitations and other limitations, and monitoring requirements
necessary to assure that any applicantfor a Federal license or permit
will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard of performance

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 650, 653.
48. PUD No. 1of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993) (granting

certiorari).
49. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct: 1900, 1908 (1994).
50. Id. at 1912.
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under section 1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent standard, or
pretreatment standard under section 1317 of this title, and with any
other appropriaterequirement of State law set forth in such certification, and shall become a condition on any Federal license or permit
subject to the provisions of this section."'
The Court reasoned that because the text refers to the compliance of the applicant,
rather than the discharge, this section authorizes the State to impose conditions on
the certification of the project beyond specific limitations on discharges.' "Section
401(d) thus allows the State to impose 'other limitations' on the project in general
to assure compliance with various provisions of the Clean Water Act and with 'any
other appropriate requirement of State law."'"
The State asserted that the minimum stream flow requirements were imposed to
ensure compliance with the State's water quality standards. The Court found that
state water quality standards adopted pursuant to section 303 are valid on two
grounds: (1) as "other limitations" or (2) as "any other appropriate requirement of
State law."' However, the Court limited this portion of its holding by stating that
it was only determining the status of limitations imposed pursuant to state water
quality standards adopted pursuant to section 303 and was not determining the status
of any other state laws.55 Therefore, while it is clear that federally mandated state
laws may not be preempted by FERC, it is unclear whether other state laws relating
to water quality may be included as conditions of section 401 certification.
Therefore, after Jefferson County, it is questionable whether energy laws, land use
regulations, dam construction regulations, and state environmental quality review
regulations not included in section 303 will be preempted by FERC. Considering
the results of FirstIowa and California v. FERC,56 both suggesting broad federal
preemption of state authority, it appears unlikely that state regulations not mandated
by federal law will be considered binding conditions of section 401 certification.
2. Minimum Stream Flow Conditions are Within the Scope of the State's
Authority
Following the initial determination of the scope of the State's authority under
section 401, the Court considered whether imposition of the minimum stream flow
conditions was within the scope of the State's authority. The Court considered and
rejected three important arguments which Petitioners offered against the minimum
flows being within the State's authority. Prior to the decision in this case, each of

51. Clean Water Act § 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
52. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1908, 1909.
53. Id. at 1909.
In arriving at this conclusion the Court defers to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
interpretation of § 401 as it is shown through EPA regulations implementing the section. Such
deference to the EPA regulations occurs throughout the opinion, and is supported by the Court's holding
in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1909.
55. Id. at 1910.
56. 497 U.S. 1040 (1990).
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these three arguments was a point of contention with regard to section 401
certification.
a) The Project Must be Consistentwith Both the Water Quality Criteriaand
the Designated Uses
First, Petitioners argued that the State may only protect designated uses through
the implementation of specific criteria. The Court disagreed and held that a plain
reading of section 303(c)(2)(A) of the CWA indicated that the project must satisfy
both the designated uses and the water quality criteria.57 The criteria act to protect
all bodies of water located in the State by setting minimum specific numerical and
narrative limitations on pollution. In many instances bodies of water have specific
characteristics, such as being a spawning ground for salmonid, which are not
properly protected by these general criteria. Therefore, states may designate certain
uses as attendant to specific bodies of water. The requirement that the project not
interfere with specific designated uses of a specific water body acts in concert with
the more general criteria to more fully protect the particular attributes of that water
body."9 For example, in Jefferson County the State sought to protect the designated
use of salmonid migration, rearing, spawning, and harvesting.
b) Diminishment of Water Quantity May Be Considered Pollution
Second, Petitioners argued that the CWA only applies to water "quality," and
does not allow the State to regulate water "quantity." The Court held that the
diminishment of water quantity can be considered water pollution. 9 This holding
allows states to set minimum stream flow rates as a means of protecting state water
quality standards. The ability to regulate water quantity effectively gives the states
a broad regulatory authority over hydropower projects because the water flow is the
essential element of hydropower production.
c) Minimum Flow Requirements Imposed Under Section 303 Do Not Interfere
with FERC's Authority Under the FPA
Third, Petitioners argued that FERC's authority under the FPA preempts the
State's authority to impose minimum stream flow requirements.' In California v.
FERC,6' the Supreme Court held that minimum stream flow levels set by the
California Water Resources Board were preempted to the extent that they conflicted
with FERC's authority under the FPA.62 However, in the instant case, the Court
found that there was no conflict with FERC under federal law because FERC had
not yet issued a license. In essence, the CWA provides for state authorization of
hydropower projects at the licensing and relicensing stages, but only at these stages.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1910.
Id. at 1911.
Id. at 1913.
Id. at 1914.
495 U.S. 490 (IS 90).
Id. at 506.
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The federal government thereby vests significant authorization in the states, but only
allows exercise of the power at these specific stages. This is especially significant
because licenses are issued for fifty-year periods.
d) The State's Minimum Stream Flow ConditionsAre a ProperApplication of
State and FederalAntidegradationRegulations
After considering and rejecting the three arguments made by Petitioners, the
Court considered and accepted the State's argument that implementation of
minimum stream flows was necessary to implement the antidegradation policy found
in section 303 of the CWA. The enactment of the CWA in 1972 provided for the
incorporation of state antidegradation policies into federal law.' William Hines has
followed the development of nondegradation policy and states that:
[i]n a nutshell, nondegradation policy requires that no significant
deterioration be allowed in existing high quality air and water unless
necessary to meet compelling social or economic needs.... Thus, the
nondegradation policy serves to create a rebuttable presumption in favor
of preservation of existing high quality air and water resources, and
casts on the would be developer the burden of demonstrating either that
the proposed enterprise will not significantly degrade ambient resources
or, that if such degradation will occur, it is justified by the social and
economic value of the activity.'
The Court's recognition of the states' antidegradation policies is not necessarily a
wholesale adoption of a federal antidegradation policy. A State may still be subject
to pollution from one of its neighbors.' However, recognition of the policy does
allow for a substantial level of environmental protection within those states who
desire to maintain high ambient standards in their water bodies.
D. Justice Thomas' Dissent
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, disagreed with the opinion of the
majority on three grounds. First, the majority's interpretation of section 401 does
not properly harmonize section 401(a)(1) and section 401(d) of the CWA. Second,
the majority's interpretation gives states too much authority to impose conditions on
hydropower projects. Third, the opinion disrupts the balance in federal and state
powers which was created in California v. FERC.
The majority's interpretation of section 401(d) as giving broader authority to the
states than that obtained in section 401(a)(1) effectively gives the states the power
to set conditions which are unrelated to discharges. Justice Thomas states that "[t]he
power to set conditions that are unrelated to discharges is, of course, nothing but a

63. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1912.
64. N. William Hines, A Decade of NondegradationPolicy in Congressand the Courts: The Erratic
Pursuitof Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IowA L. REV. 643, 645 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
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conditional power to deny certification for reasons unrelated to discharges."' It is
Thomas' view that this interpretation eviscerates section 401(a)(1). Justice Thomas
would regard as appropriate only those conditions which relate to discharges, and
discharges would be defined narrowly such that they would not include minimum
stream flows.'
Justice Thomas argues that the states' authority is further unjustifiably broadened
by the majority's holding that designated uses are enforceable independent of the
water quality criteria. Thus, the states could hypothetically impose conditions which
are unrelated either to discharges or to specific water quality criteria. For example,
the State could require minimum stream flow levels to accommodate recreational
users if recreation were a designated use of the water under state water quality
standards.
The final contention of the dissenting Justice is that the majority's interpretation
of section 401 disrupts the balance of power between federal and state interests
under the FPA. In California v. FERC, the Supreme Court held that minimum
stream flow levels set by the California Water Resources Board were preempted to
the extent that they conflicted with FERC's authority under the FPA. Justice
Thomas reads Californiav. FERC as denying states a veto power over hydropower
projects:
Californiav. FERC reaffirmed our decision in First Iowa Hydro-Electric
Cooperative v. FPC, in which we warned against "vest[ing] in [state
authorities] a veto power" over federal hydroelectric projects. Such
authority, we concluded, could "destroy the effectiveness" of the FPA
and "subordinate to the control of the State the 'comprehensive'
planning" with which the administering agency (at that time the Federal
Power Commission) was charged.
Today, the Court gives the States precisely the veto power over
hydroelectric projects that we determined in California v. FERC and
First Iowa they did not possess.'
The broad veto power that the Court recognizes the states as holding over
hydroelectric projects creates a substantial limitation on California v. FERC. The
federal preemption cf state law which was upheld in Californiav. FERC will only
apply after FERC has issued a license. Since section 401 certification is a condition
of issuance of such a license, the states will effectively have a veto power over
hydropower projects at the licensing or relicensing stage.

66. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1916 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1915. Jutice Thomas states that "discharge" should be understood in its plain and
ordinary meaning. However, the term discharge has been difficult to define in § 401 cases.
Section 502(12) of the Clean Water Act defines the discharge of a pollutant as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." See also Lisa M. Bogardus, State Certificationof
Hydroelectric Facilities Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 51 n.71
(1992).
68. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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E. The Effect of PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of
Ecology on the Licensing of FederalHydropower Projects
1. The Meaning of "Discharge"
The first step in determining whether section 401 applies to a hydropower project
is to ask whether the project results in a discharge. The majority opinion does not
address what constitutes a discharge, but notes that, "at a minimum, the project will
result in two possible discharges - the release of dredged and fill material during
the construction of the project, and the discharge of water at the end of the tailrace
after the water has been used to generate electricity."' Generally, courts have
presumed that a discharge exists in section 401 cases."
2. Protection of Designated Uses and State Water Quality Standards
Once the threshold requirement of the existence of a discharge is met, the next
step is to determine whether the project will violate either a designated use or the
numerical and narrative criteria of state water quality standards, or the state
antidegradation policy. Courts have been indecisive about what a State may
consider in determining whether to issue a section 401 certification. 7 The majority
opinion found that the State may impose any requirements which ensure compliance
with the designated uses adopted pursuant to section 303.' However, the Court
expressly declined to delineate what other types of state laws would be deemed
"appropriate" under section 401(d).73 States may set broad criteria within section
303; however, it is unclear whether state laws which are not contemplated under
section 303 will be appropriate. A future issue could be the delineation of what
types of laws are and are not authorized by section 303.
States seemingly have wide discretion in determining water quality standards for
purposes of section 303. Federal courts have uniformly held that the proper forum
for the review of section 401(d) conditions is in state court, where states are more
likely to find ratification of such wide discretion.74 The control which the federal
government exercises over the state water quality decisions rests with the EPA, who
must approve the standards before they go into effect.75 Considering the contrasting

69. Id. at 1908.
70. Bogardus, supra note 67, at 52; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1471, 1483
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (indicating the location of the discharge, but failing to describe the nature of the
discharge); De Rham v. Diamond, 295 N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1973) (the court does not address whether a
discharge would be created by the project, but does consider § 401 certification).
71. Boardus, supra note 67, at 52.
72. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1909.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see alo Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park v. E.P.A., 684
F.2d 1041, 1056 (lst Cir. 1982) (stating that "the proper forum to review the appropriateness of a state's
certification is the state court, and that federal courts and agencies are without authority to review the
validity of requirements imposed under state law or in a state's certification"); see also Andrew H.
Sawyer, Rock Creek Revisited: State Water Quality CertificationofHydroelectric Projects in California,
25 PAC. L.J. 973, 995 (1994).
75. Clean Water Act § 303(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1988).
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natures of the EPA and FERC, it is logical to conclude that State water quality
standards which afford increased protection to the environment will be more
favorably received by the EPA than FERC.
The Court took note of some environment friendly sections of the Washington
Administrative Code (WAC). For example, the WAC lists "aesthetic values" as one
of its water quality criteria.76 The WAC also lists such items as wildlife habitat and
recreation as characteristic uses.' It appears that conditions such as minimum
stream flows, protecting narrative criteria, and traditionally overlooked uses will be
proper assertions of state authority under section 401.
3. The State and FederalAntidegradation Policies
The State's antidegradation policy is another avenue by which a State may justify
protection of environmental resources under the section 401 certification. The Court
found that Washington's imposition of minimum stream flows was a proper
regulation in light of the state and federal antidegradation regulations.78 In
describing the federal policy, the majority stated:
These regulations require States to "develop and adopt a statewide
antidegradation policy and identify the methods for implementing such
policy." 40 CFR § 131.12 (1992). These "implementation methods
shall, at a minimum, be consistent with the . . . [e]xisting instream
water uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect the
existing uses shall be maintained and protected." Ibid. EPA has
explained that under its antidegradation regulation, "no activity is allowable , ,79. . . which could partially or completely eliminate any existing
use.

The policy thereby establishes a minimum, but it does not control the extent to
which a State might use the policy to exclude hydropower projects. The
antidegradation policy is a federally mandated floor which all states must comply
with in order to further the goals of the CWA, which are to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. ' To further
advance these goals, the CWA allows states to take measures which are supplemental to those mandated by the federal act.8 ' As a result, states have the power to set
state water quality standards which are so cost prohibitive that they make
development of a hydropower project economically infeasible.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1911; see WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201-045(c)(viii) (1990).
Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1911; see WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201-045(b)(iv), (v) (1990).
Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1912.
Id.
Clean Water Act § 101(a).
Id. § 510.
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NOTES

4. Preemption Under the FPA
The result reached in Jefferson County appears to be in conflict with the result
reached by the Court in California v. FERC.' In California v. FERC, the Court
held that under section 27 of the FPA, the regulatory authority of FERC superseded
state minimum flow requirements which were in conflict with the federal permit,
as evidenced by its permit requirements for minimum instream flows.' This case
involved a hydropower project on Rock Creek in California. FERC issued a license
to the project operator in 1983 and set interim minimum flow rates for the bypass
reach. The project operator then submitted a report recommending that the interim
minimum flow rates be adopted as the permanent minimum flow rates. FERC then
adopted these interim rates as the permanent rates. In 1987, the state Water
Resources Control Board (WRCB) issued a water permit to the project requiring it
to maintain significantly higher minimum flow rates.
The conflict between Jefferson County and California v. FERC is most clearly
shown by the final sentence of Justice O'Connor's opinion in California: "[W]e
agree that allowing California to impose the challenged requirements would be
contrary to congressional intent regarding the Commission's licensing authority and
would "constitute a veto of the project that was approved and licensed by
FERC."' The distinction which Justice O'Connor recognizes in the Jefferson
County opinion is that in Jefferson County the project had not yet been licensed by
FERC, while in California, the project had already received its federal license,"
Thus, in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, there was no conflict between federal and
state rights because state certification is a prerequisite to federal licensing. The
distinction is one of timing. The CWA has authorized states to affect the federal
licensing process at either the licensing or relicensing stage, but not at any other
stage.
It is also significant that in California,Justice O'Connor stressed the necessity of
adhering to precedent, especially in cases involving statutory construction.' The
relevant precedent is FirstIowa, which established a broad federal regulatory role
for FERC.' By focusing on the narrow issues surrounding the CWA, the majority
in Jefferson County was able to execute an effective end-run around FERC's
expansive authority under First Iowa and its progeny.

82. 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
83. Id. at 504; see First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946)
(holding that federal rights preempted state rights under § 27 of the FPA except to the extent the rights
were "saved" to the states).
84. California,495 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added) (quoting FirstIowa, 66 S. Ct. at 911-12).
85. Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1914.
86. California,495 U.S. at 505.
87. See Michael C. Blumm, Federalism, Hydroelectric Licensing and the Future of Minimum
Streamflows After California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 21 ENVTL. L. 113, 120 (1991).
Attempting to explain the Court's holding in First Iowa, the author concludes that "the best explanation
of FirstIowa may be an example of an activist Court's willingness to help promote the perceived federal
interest in hydroelectric development." Id.
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Justice Thomas is technically incorrect in stating that the majority's decision in
Jefferson County "gives the States precisely the veto power over hydroelectric
projects that we determined in California v. FERC and First Iowa they did not
possess.""8 The veto power in California v. FERC and First Iowa contemplated
vetoing a project after it has gained federal approval, whereas the veto power in
Jefferson County allows a state to veto a project prior to federal licensing or
relicensing.
Justice Thomas is correct in recognizing that the majority's decision recognizes
a substantial state power over the licensing process of hydropower projects. In fact,
his assertion that the State's mistake in Californiawas that it did not hit upon the
proper device to accomplish its objectives is correct. 9 Justice Thomas makes this
assertion with a derogatory tone, aimed at the Court's interpretation of the CWA.
This derogation would be better aimed at Congress for creating an overly complex
and disorganized regulatory structure. Our relationship to water is highly complex
because of its necessity and the many beneficial uses we make of it. This
complexity is reflected in the regulatory competition which exists between federal
agencies, and especially between FERC and state regulatory agencies.
IV. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's opinion in Jefferson County interprets the CWA as granting
to the states a broad regulatory authority over hydroelectric projects. The federal
standards create a baseline below which the states may not go. The states may then
build upon this foundation to guarantee that specific state water policy concerns are
met. This power allows the states to ensure that hydropower projects fit within their
water management policies.
The decision allows states to control water quality within their boundaries. It is
likely that hydropower projects will have to satisfy heightened environmental
standards in many states compared to those promulgated by FERC in the past.
Higher environmental standards at the state level will increase the costs of
hydroelectric production. However, balanced against the increasing relative demands
on natural resources for recreational, aesthetic, and conservation uses, this
interpretation of the CWA provides the states with a means to utilize their natural
resources in the manner they consider most beneficial.
T. Mike Blake, Jr.

88. Jefferson Count, 114 S. Ct. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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